DanNolan
Well-Known Member
- Oct 14, 2006
- 1,369
- 2,524
Though there was an air of inevitability before the tournament regarding the failure of England to end their quarter-final hoodoo, it is worth analysing just how much of a success the tournament was. Can the fact that England reached a quarter-final as group winners and never lost a match before penalties be taken at face value? Or should we delve deeper into the performances and philosophy that resulted in such a result, or lack of result, depending on your expectations of the nation.
It is important first and foremost to acknowledge the lack of preparation time that was allowed for the new manager before this tournament; there is little doubt that basing Roy Hodgson’s potential as a successful England manager purely on this tournament would therefore be absurd. In addition, the fact that Hodgson matched the best performance of any England manager since 1996 must encourage a positive outlook on what is to come in his reign. Hodgson’s major success seems to be his achievement in regaining some pride in the players, to play for the shirt. A major problem that had been identified with the previous managerial regime was the lack of effort and interest when wearing the three lions, a trait heavily linked with the lack of an English-born manager. If nothing else was gained during this tournament there can be absolutely no doubt that the players gave their all for the cause in terms of effort, and a welcome change it most certainly was.It must be noted that the employment of Gary Neville seems to have had a major impact in this respect and he maybe in this respect deserves as much credit as Hodgson.
When identifying positives, the defensive players in addition to the two central midfielders demand huge acclaim for their performance. England, defensively were as good as anything in the tournament. Bar 15 minutes of madness in the game against Sweden, England conceded just a single goal, and that was one of individual brilliance from Samir Nasri. England under Hodgson are incredibly difficult to beat or even to break down and score against. It is of little doubt though, that where they have gained in defensive stability from Hodgson’s tactics, they have ultimately become a team of little attacking threat and flair.
England have adopted a new way of playing in which they set up in a rigid 442 formation, one that Hodgson has adopted throughout his managerial career with mixed results. This formation breeds solid foundations in which the central midfielders have much defensive responsiblity together with the wide midfielders, who are asked to stay narrow and protect their full backs throughout. Where this formation encourages counter attacking football in the domestic game, as has been displayed by many of the premier league teams of the last 10 years, it struggles to cope with the lack of tempo found at international level.
Under Fabio Capello at the 2010 World cup, England set up with a 442 formation and struggled to keep the ball for long periods. The tournament itself is remembered as one of total failure following a dramatic 4-1 reverse to Germany, who themselves produced a clinic of counter attacking football. The England team returned disgraced and it took a long time for the nation’s pride in the team to return. Following the tournament itself, Capello bemoaned the ability of English players to retain the ball in major tournament football, and as a result vowed to learn from his failings. His response was to change the shape of the team to a 4231, or 433 formation of many interpretations. He like many experts of international football came to the conclusion that in the modern game you cannot win a game if you do not have the ball for such long periods. Extra bodies in the centre of midfield are a must in order to gain control in the centre of the park and it’s importance has been illustrated by its use by the World and European champions Spain, who even resorted to fielding up to 6 midfielders at once during this tournament.
England endured a successful qualifying campaign under Capello and began to adjust to the modern continental formation that serves all of the top European nations so well, creating a confidence that this tournament would be an improvement. After beating Spain in his last game, albeit a friendly, Capello resigned for unrelated reasons. The worry following this tournament must be that even though England managed to show much improved passion and defensive play, the problems of past tournaments persist. It can be argued that all of the good work that Capello had achieved since his major failings of the World Cup 2010, in changing England’s philosophy into a proven formation at this level in which they try to keep possession of the ball, has been undone. This leaves them in precisely the same position, analysing the same failings that they were two years ago albeit with more pride in the effort given by the players.
While Hodgson argues that statistics aren’t important, they do make for pretty grim reading. The fact that England enjoyed less than 40% possession on average throughout the tournament (in games that include Sweden and Ukraine, both massively inferior to England in the World rankings) shows the fact that England couldn’t retain possession. It isn’t as if England effectively played on the counter attack either, illustrated by the lack of chances that were created by england (just 2.8 shots on target per game on average). His use of this formation in which England let the opposition have the ball in areas of the pitch not deemed a danger to them defensively, though impressive in terms of goals conceded, created a situation in which an already depleted England midfield was out on their feet in tiredness by the third game of the group.
In addition to this, the formation adopted eradicated much of the attacking threat offered by the England wingers, and undoubtably had a huge bearing on below par performances by Ashley Young in particular. He was stifled by his defensive responsibility leading to him not possessing the fitness or field position to hurt the opposition in the areas of the pitch in which he is most effective. It is of no coincidence that the one time in the competition that a winger, namely Theo Walcott, had a good game was in the only game in which England went behind and as a result had to free their wingers from their defensive shackles. Interestingly this game proved the only one in which England enjoyed more possession than their rivals (52%), and is generally thought to be their best performance of the tournament. This adds much credit to the opinion that a strong attack is a successful means of defence rather than letting the opposition dominate the ball for long periods trying to nick the odd goal on the break. You simply cannot allow international teams to keep the ball for such long periods. Unlike in the Premier League, international teams slow the game down to their own pace and don’t leave as much space to exploit on the counter attack, therefore making it very difficult for such a formation to work; especially against the more accomplished teams with good passers of the ball who don’t make many mistakes to exploit.
It is feasible that Hodgson will learn from those same misgivings that Capello did, and that England will go on to adopt a new formation with fresh young players and refreshing impetus in the future. It is also understandable that after coming into the job with such short notice, he had little choice but to go with “what he knew”. It is however extremely difficult not to feel that during this tournament from a footballing point of view England have gone backwards 2 years and need much work in order to ever sit at internationals top table at major tournaments.
It is important first and foremost to acknowledge the lack of preparation time that was allowed for the new manager before this tournament; there is little doubt that basing Roy Hodgson’s potential as a successful England manager purely on this tournament would therefore be absurd. In addition, the fact that Hodgson matched the best performance of any England manager since 1996 must encourage a positive outlook on what is to come in his reign. Hodgson’s major success seems to be his achievement in regaining some pride in the players, to play for the shirt. A major problem that had been identified with the previous managerial regime was the lack of effort and interest when wearing the three lions, a trait heavily linked with the lack of an English-born manager. If nothing else was gained during this tournament there can be absolutely no doubt that the players gave their all for the cause in terms of effort, and a welcome change it most certainly was.It must be noted that the employment of Gary Neville seems to have had a major impact in this respect and he maybe in this respect deserves as much credit as Hodgson.
When identifying positives, the defensive players in addition to the two central midfielders demand huge acclaim for their performance. England, defensively were as good as anything in the tournament. Bar 15 minutes of madness in the game against Sweden, England conceded just a single goal, and that was one of individual brilliance from Samir Nasri. England under Hodgson are incredibly difficult to beat or even to break down and score against. It is of little doubt though, that where they have gained in defensive stability from Hodgson’s tactics, they have ultimately become a team of little attacking threat and flair.
England have adopted a new way of playing in which they set up in a rigid 442 formation, one that Hodgson has adopted throughout his managerial career with mixed results. This formation breeds solid foundations in which the central midfielders have much defensive responsiblity together with the wide midfielders, who are asked to stay narrow and protect their full backs throughout. Where this formation encourages counter attacking football in the domestic game, as has been displayed by many of the premier league teams of the last 10 years, it struggles to cope with the lack of tempo found at international level.
Under Fabio Capello at the 2010 World cup, England set up with a 442 formation and struggled to keep the ball for long periods. The tournament itself is remembered as one of total failure following a dramatic 4-1 reverse to Germany, who themselves produced a clinic of counter attacking football. The England team returned disgraced and it took a long time for the nation’s pride in the team to return. Following the tournament itself, Capello bemoaned the ability of English players to retain the ball in major tournament football, and as a result vowed to learn from his failings. His response was to change the shape of the team to a 4231, or 433 formation of many interpretations. He like many experts of international football came to the conclusion that in the modern game you cannot win a game if you do not have the ball for such long periods. Extra bodies in the centre of midfield are a must in order to gain control in the centre of the park and it’s importance has been illustrated by its use by the World and European champions Spain, who even resorted to fielding up to 6 midfielders at once during this tournament.
England endured a successful qualifying campaign under Capello and began to adjust to the modern continental formation that serves all of the top European nations so well, creating a confidence that this tournament would be an improvement. After beating Spain in his last game, albeit a friendly, Capello resigned for unrelated reasons. The worry following this tournament must be that even though England managed to show much improved passion and defensive play, the problems of past tournaments persist. It can be argued that all of the good work that Capello had achieved since his major failings of the World Cup 2010, in changing England’s philosophy into a proven formation at this level in which they try to keep possession of the ball, has been undone. This leaves them in precisely the same position, analysing the same failings that they were two years ago albeit with more pride in the effort given by the players.
While Hodgson argues that statistics aren’t important, they do make for pretty grim reading. The fact that England enjoyed less than 40% possession on average throughout the tournament (in games that include Sweden and Ukraine, both massively inferior to England in the World rankings) shows the fact that England couldn’t retain possession. It isn’t as if England effectively played on the counter attack either, illustrated by the lack of chances that were created by england (just 2.8 shots on target per game on average). His use of this formation in which England let the opposition have the ball in areas of the pitch not deemed a danger to them defensively, though impressive in terms of goals conceded, created a situation in which an already depleted England midfield was out on their feet in tiredness by the third game of the group.
In addition to this, the formation adopted eradicated much of the attacking threat offered by the England wingers, and undoubtably had a huge bearing on below par performances by Ashley Young in particular. He was stifled by his defensive responsibility leading to him not possessing the fitness or field position to hurt the opposition in the areas of the pitch in which he is most effective. It is of no coincidence that the one time in the competition that a winger, namely Theo Walcott, had a good game was in the only game in which England went behind and as a result had to free their wingers from their defensive shackles. Interestingly this game proved the only one in which England enjoyed more possession than their rivals (52%), and is generally thought to be their best performance of the tournament. This adds much credit to the opinion that a strong attack is a successful means of defence rather than letting the opposition dominate the ball for long periods trying to nick the odd goal on the break. You simply cannot allow international teams to keep the ball for such long periods. Unlike in the Premier League, international teams slow the game down to their own pace and don’t leave as much space to exploit on the counter attack, therefore making it very difficult for such a formation to work; especially against the more accomplished teams with good passers of the ball who don’t make many mistakes to exploit.
It is feasible that Hodgson will learn from those same misgivings that Capello did, and that England will go on to adopt a new formation with fresh young players and refreshing impetus in the future. It is also understandable that after coming into the job with such short notice, he had little choice but to go with “what he knew”. It is however extremely difficult not to feel that during this tournament from a footballing point of view England have gone backwards 2 years and need much work in order to ever sit at internationals top table at major tournaments.
