- Jun 13, 2012
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Im sure there was a tactics thread started, but i can't find it.
Anywho - This is a great read. About Marcelo Bielsa and his work with Athletic Bilbao last year.
http://chalkontheboots.wordpress.com/2012/04/27/marcelo-bielsa-method-in-the-madness/
Marcelo Bielsa – Method in the Madness
APRIL 27, 2012 14 COMMENTS
Athletic Bilbao face Atletico Madrid in the final of this season’s Europa League final following their pulsating 4-3 aggregate success over Sporting Lisbon last night. The game will mark their first appearance in the final of a European Competition since 1976/77 when they finished runners-up in the Uefa Cup, losing out on away goals to the all Italian Juventus side of Bettega, Tardelli et al.
On their path to the final, Athletic had dispatched such luminaries as AC Milan, Barcelona and enjoyed a semi final triumph on away goals over RWD Molenbeek (from Belgium in case you are wondering).
The route to this final has seen them eliminate Lokomotiv Moscow, Man Utd, Schalke and Sporting Lisbon from the knock out phase. Initially viewed as outsiders, Athletic are now the favourites for the competition.
Yet the man who delivered European football to Athletic, Joaquin Caparros, has not been around to enjoy it. A victim of the club’s presidential elections in the summer, despite steering Athletic to 6th place in La Liga and reaching the final of the Copa del Rey last season, Caparros’ contract was not renewed. Doubts over Caparros ability were surfacing, his image tarnished as being nothing more than a long ball merchant. Despite the traditional of direct football at Athletic, support for him was declining. In opportunistic fashion, the incoming President, Josu Urrutia, aware of the shifting mood, promised to deliver Marcelo Bielsa as manager if he won the election.
He did and he duly delivered Bielsa
His arrival at Athletic has generated considerable media interest which has only heightened and continually increased since their extremely impressive performances when defeating Man Utd home and away.
It had been 13 years since Bielsa last managed a club side, an ill-fated 6 game spell in charge of Espanyol which ended with his departure for the Argentine national side and Espanyol sitting in 18th position in La Liga.
How would his strict ideals for fast attacking football fit in with the physical robust football of Athletic?
Marcelo Bielsa
Marcelo “el loco” Bielsa is an idiosyncratic, obsessive character. With a thorough tactical mind and a desire for attacking football, he perfectly straddles the traditional Menotti – Bilardo dichotomy in Argentinean football.
Countless stories exist about Bielsa and his eccentricity / genius. From pacing out the length and width of opponents pitches in advance of delivering his final tactical instructions to his team, to soaking training pitches heavily prior to a session commencing due to weather forecasts suggesting heavy rain on the day of a game.
With his now famous squatting position in the technical area, a keen journalist observed how Bielsa, during a game against Villarreal, took exactly 13 paces across the technical area before squatting down again each time Villarreal attacked. This could not be a coincidence. Was this another example of his attention to detail? The same number of paces marking a ritual?
“What is coincidence, is that when there’s such a nice game going on, someone spends time counting my paces.” was Bielsa’s deeply unimpressed response.
Always an innovator, the tactical developments he has made have heavily influenced a number of key themes in the modern game especially at Barcelona were Guardiola cites Bielsa as the “best coach in the world”.
The Set Up
“Our simple ethos is this: we try and win the ball back as quickly as possible from our opponents as far up the field as we can. And by that I mean everyone is involved in regaining the ball, from the forwards through to anyone else”
“Then once we have the ball, we try and find a way of getting forward as quickly as possible, in a vertical direction if you like. But we don’t get frustrated if we can’t get it forward immediately, we aim to be comfortable on the ball, and if it’s not a case of going forward straight away, we keep it.”
Bielsa adopted a 3-3-1-3 formation with both Argentina and Chile (detailed below).
As can be seen above, the team was more or less split into two units. The 4 defensive players comprising the three defenders and the defensive midfielder and the 6 attacking players comprising the two wing backs and un enganche y tres punta (a playmaker and three forwards). As Bielsa himself outlines, the idea was to play the game in your opponents half of the pitch, hold a high defensive line and press your opponent very aggressively. An attacking but physically demanding system to employ.
Arrigo Saachi spoke of there being an ideal 25 metres between centre-forward and centre-back and Bielsa shares this sentiment even allowing for the liberalisation of the offside law, something which Saachi’s great Milan never had to contend with. The high line must always be accompanied by an intense press.
He recognises the importance of the rapid movement of the ball from front to back to catch opponents off balance, but he also sees the value in retaining possession, which is what differentiates him from the likes of Egil Olsen, a coach who always prioritises position on the field over possession and favours a percentage based approach to football in the Reepian tradition.
The wing backs push forward to support the wingers, creating 2 on 1’s against opposing full backs. Interestingly, the full back normally goes on the inside of the winger. The wingers stay high and wide to stretch the opponents defence creating the gaps which the full backs, when attacking, and the midfield runners from the second line can exploit.
There was no specific No10 with Chile. Playmaking duties can be attributed to a few differing players, and in that respect, Bielsa again aligns himself with the Saachian notion of whoever had the ball was the regista. Similarly, Bielsa talks about the value in squeezing the game into a 25-metre area, another Saachian trait.
Always the innovator, Bielsa pioneered the use of defensive midfielders in the defensive line to aid distribution. With superior passing ability, a defensive midfielder can circulate the ball quickly and their increased mobility compared against traditional central defenders allows the higher line to function better.
Using midfielders in the defensive line also increases the flexibility of the team to adapt to differing circumstances. If the opponent had two strikers, Chile would adopt a back three. If the opponent switched to 1 or 3 strikers, Chile would respond accordingly, always keeping one defender extra at the back.
Bielsa enjoyed contrasting fortunes with his native Argentina and Chile. Despite arriving as favourites for the 2002 World Cup, Argentina failed to qualify from the group stage. One of the reasons cited for the poor showing of Argentina was severe fatigue from arduous domestic campaigns preventing the players from fulfilling the extreme physical demands demanded by the Bielsa model.
Yet this contrasts sharply with Chile, although expectations were lower, his success here was still considerable. His achievements here partially stem from inheriting a group of young players from the Chile U20 team which finished in 3rd place at the 2007 U20 World Cup. Players such as Sanchez, Medel, Carmona and Vidal emerged from that team and form the backbone of the current international set up.
Chile has no particular footballing identity or traditions unlike some of its South American neighbours such as Argentina and Brazil . The Chileans bought into Bielsa’s methods and a team that finished bottom of South American World Cup qualifying group in 2002, qualified easily in 2010, finishing second. The willingness of Bielsa to play the young players promoted from the U20 team, fast tracking them to the first team was central. Young impressionable minds who were physically fit and accepting of the exacting Bielsa philosophy.
Despite a second round defeat to Brazil in 2010, Bielsa and his players gained considerable recognition and appreciation not least because of their extreme attacking mentality at a time of increased conservatism in the game and the proliferation of a defensive minded 4-2-3-1 approach.
Given all of the above, how would he fare with Athletic?
Athletic Bilbao
Athletic are widely considered the most “English” of Spanish sides with a reputation for a direct style of play which dates back to the management of the influential Fred Pentland in the late 1920’s and 1930’s.
Pentland was regarded as a radical coach who favoured a short-passing game (still comparably long by modern standards. His was definitely not a tiki-taka approach) but he liked his central defenders and centre-forwards big and robust. The likes of Fernando Llorente and Fernando Amorebieta are the modern incarnations of that tradition.
Athletic retain a direct, but not long ball, style.
The signing policy of Athletic is well documented. However loose and flexible it has become in recent times, Athletic can still only play Basques or those coming through la cantera (the literal translation is the quarry. Players, like diamonds, are found in the quarry / ground and polished, becoming the finished article). Athletic can, and have, plundered neighbouring teams for their best players such as Joseba Exteberria, Javi Martinez, David Lopez and Gaizka Torquero but there will always be a considerable reliance upon la cantera for future players too.
Upon joining Athletic, Bielsa did not ask for any new signings, working with the existing squad. Interestingly, at the start of the season, Bielsa jettisoned a number of senior players at Athletic. Whether they were considered unable to adapt to the Bielsa methods physically or would challenge his methods intellectually is open for debate.
The key ingredients existed from the outset for Bielsa to succeed.
The tradition for a direct style of football played at a high tempo was central to both Athletic and Bielsa. The reliance upon young players from la cantera gave Bielsa the opportunity to again mould young players to his footballing philosophy just as he did with Chile.
Like la cantera, Bielsa has found fertile ground at Athletic.
The Start
In pre-season Bielsa used varying formations with players operating in a number of different positions. The pre-season game against Spurs demonstrated his willingness to consider a range of possibilities and ideas in search of answers.
The use of a back three was in response to Spurs playing two strikers whilst Gabilondo and Torquero were positioned on the wings as Bielsa sought the correct solution.
This experimentation continued into the early league games. A lack of structure and cohesion leading to decidedly poor performances with the team lacking clarity as they toiled with the implementation of Bielsa’s ideas. The odd line ups continued too, only serving to add confusion to the team as players found themselves fulfilling new roles and adapting to a completely new method of playing.
The case of Oscar De Marcos is a perfect example. Notionally a striker or winger, he started the season playing at left back against Rayo Vallecano. The following week he was in midfield against Espanyol before moving back to left back and then left wing back.
With no wins in their opening 5 games, this was Athletic’s worst start to a league in 32 years accumulating just 2 points. Athletic travelled to Sociedad for the Basque derby in September and the formation changed again, back to a 4-2-3-1, a recognised formation and one they players were assured with, but more importantly than that, players were now adjusting to the Bielsa style and being played in appropriate positions.
De Marcos was now firmly in midfield, deployed as a shuttler moving back and forth, linking with the attack. Autenexte had been brought back into the fold at left back. A proper left back and a good one. Llorente had adjusted to actually moving across the front line as opposed to being stationary waiting for the ball to land on his head. His new role required much greater movement than he had been used to.
A double from Llorente sealed the points and Athletic began moving forward with some purpose. The win brought belief as well as a healthy dose of relief, easing the pressure on Bielsa.
It has taken time for Bielsa time to settle in Bilbao. Upon arrival he began instigating radical changes, offloading nine players and training became far more theoretical with key moves repeatedly practised on the training ground. This represented a clear departure from Caparros and Bielsa himself acknowledged the early errors which he made.
But as with Chile, the players accepted his ideas and began implementing them. And the results arrived.
Anywho - This is a great read. About Marcelo Bielsa and his work with Athletic Bilbao last year.
http://chalkontheboots.wordpress.com/2012/04/27/marcelo-bielsa-method-in-the-madness/
Marcelo Bielsa – Method in the Madness
APRIL 27, 2012 14 COMMENTS
Athletic Bilbao face Atletico Madrid in the final of this season’s Europa League final following their pulsating 4-3 aggregate success over Sporting Lisbon last night. The game will mark their first appearance in the final of a European Competition since 1976/77 when they finished runners-up in the Uefa Cup, losing out on away goals to the all Italian Juventus side of Bettega, Tardelli et al.
On their path to the final, Athletic had dispatched such luminaries as AC Milan, Barcelona and enjoyed a semi final triumph on away goals over RWD Molenbeek (from Belgium in case you are wondering).
The route to this final has seen them eliminate Lokomotiv Moscow, Man Utd, Schalke and Sporting Lisbon from the knock out phase. Initially viewed as outsiders, Athletic are now the favourites for the competition.
Yet the man who delivered European football to Athletic, Joaquin Caparros, has not been around to enjoy it. A victim of the club’s presidential elections in the summer, despite steering Athletic to 6th place in La Liga and reaching the final of the Copa del Rey last season, Caparros’ contract was not renewed. Doubts over Caparros ability were surfacing, his image tarnished as being nothing more than a long ball merchant. Despite the traditional of direct football at Athletic, support for him was declining. In opportunistic fashion, the incoming President, Josu Urrutia, aware of the shifting mood, promised to deliver Marcelo Bielsa as manager if he won the election.
He did and he duly delivered Bielsa
His arrival at Athletic has generated considerable media interest which has only heightened and continually increased since their extremely impressive performances when defeating Man Utd home and away.
It had been 13 years since Bielsa last managed a club side, an ill-fated 6 game spell in charge of Espanyol which ended with his departure for the Argentine national side and Espanyol sitting in 18th position in La Liga.
How would his strict ideals for fast attacking football fit in with the physical robust football of Athletic?
Marcelo Bielsa
Marcelo “el loco” Bielsa is an idiosyncratic, obsessive character. With a thorough tactical mind and a desire for attacking football, he perfectly straddles the traditional Menotti – Bilardo dichotomy in Argentinean football.
Countless stories exist about Bielsa and his eccentricity / genius. From pacing out the length and width of opponents pitches in advance of delivering his final tactical instructions to his team, to soaking training pitches heavily prior to a session commencing due to weather forecasts suggesting heavy rain on the day of a game.
With his now famous squatting position in the technical area, a keen journalist observed how Bielsa, during a game against Villarreal, took exactly 13 paces across the technical area before squatting down again each time Villarreal attacked. This could not be a coincidence. Was this another example of his attention to detail? The same number of paces marking a ritual?
“What is coincidence, is that when there’s such a nice game going on, someone spends time counting my paces.” was Bielsa’s deeply unimpressed response.
Always an innovator, the tactical developments he has made have heavily influenced a number of key themes in the modern game especially at Barcelona were Guardiola cites Bielsa as the “best coach in the world”.
The Set Up
“Our simple ethos is this: we try and win the ball back as quickly as possible from our opponents as far up the field as we can. And by that I mean everyone is involved in regaining the ball, from the forwards through to anyone else”
“Then once we have the ball, we try and find a way of getting forward as quickly as possible, in a vertical direction if you like. But we don’t get frustrated if we can’t get it forward immediately, we aim to be comfortable on the ball, and if it’s not a case of going forward straight away, we keep it.”
Bielsa adopted a 3-3-1-3 formation with both Argentina and Chile (detailed below).
As can be seen above, the team was more or less split into two units. The 4 defensive players comprising the three defenders and the defensive midfielder and the 6 attacking players comprising the two wing backs and un enganche y tres punta (a playmaker and three forwards). As Bielsa himself outlines, the idea was to play the game in your opponents half of the pitch, hold a high defensive line and press your opponent very aggressively. An attacking but physically demanding system to employ.
Arrigo Saachi spoke of there being an ideal 25 metres between centre-forward and centre-back and Bielsa shares this sentiment even allowing for the liberalisation of the offside law, something which Saachi’s great Milan never had to contend with. The high line must always be accompanied by an intense press.
He recognises the importance of the rapid movement of the ball from front to back to catch opponents off balance, but he also sees the value in retaining possession, which is what differentiates him from the likes of Egil Olsen, a coach who always prioritises position on the field over possession and favours a percentage based approach to football in the Reepian tradition.
The wing backs push forward to support the wingers, creating 2 on 1’s against opposing full backs. Interestingly, the full back normally goes on the inside of the winger. The wingers stay high and wide to stretch the opponents defence creating the gaps which the full backs, when attacking, and the midfield runners from the second line can exploit.
There was no specific No10 with Chile. Playmaking duties can be attributed to a few differing players, and in that respect, Bielsa again aligns himself with the Saachian notion of whoever had the ball was the regista. Similarly, Bielsa talks about the value in squeezing the game into a 25-metre area, another Saachian trait.
Always the innovator, Bielsa pioneered the use of defensive midfielders in the defensive line to aid distribution. With superior passing ability, a defensive midfielder can circulate the ball quickly and their increased mobility compared against traditional central defenders allows the higher line to function better.
Using midfielders in the defensive line also increases the flexibility of the team to adapt to differing circumstances. If the opponent had two strikers, Chile would adopt a back three. If the opponent switched to 1 or 3 strikers, Chile would respond accordingly, always keeping one defender extra at the back.
Bielsa enjoyed contrasting fortunes with his native Argentina and Chile. Despite arriving as favourites for the 2002 World Cup, Argentina failed to qualify from the group stage. One of the reasons cited for the poor showing of Argentina was severe fatigue from arduous domestic campaigns preventing the players from fulfilling the extreme physical demands demanded by the Bielsa model.
Yet this contrasts sharply with Chile, although expectations were lower, his success here was still considerable. His achievements here partially stem from inheriting a group of young players from the Chile U20 team which finished in 3rd place at the 2007 U20 World Cup. Players such as Sanchez, Medel, Carmona and Vidal emerged from that team and form the backbone of the current international set up.
Chile has no particular footballing identity or traditions unlike some of its South American neighbours such as Argentina and Brazil . The Chileans bought into Bielsa’s methods and a team that finished bottom of South American World Cup qualifying group in 2002, qualified easily in 2010, finishing second. The willingness of Bielsa to play the young players promoted from the U20 team, fast tracking them to the first team was central. Young impressionable minds who were physically fit and accepting of the exacting Bielsa philosophy.
Despite a second round defeat to Brazil in 2010, Bielsa and his players gained considerable recognition and appreciation not least because of their extreme attacking mentality at a time of increased conservatism in the game and the proliferation of a defensive minded 4-2-3-1 approach.
Given all of the above, how would he fare with Athletic?
Athletic Bilbao
Athletic are widely considered the most “English” of Spanish sides with a reputation for a direct style of play which dates back to the management of the influential Fred Pentland in the late 1920’s and 1930’s.
Pentland was regarded as a radical coach who favoured a short-passing game (still comparably long by modern standards. His was definitely not a tiki-taka approach) but he liked his central defenders and centre-forwards big and robust. The likes of Fernando Llorente and Fernando Amorebieta are the modern incarnations of that tradition.
Athletic retain a direct, but not long ball, style.
The signing policy of Athletic is well documented. However loose and flexible it has become in recent times, Athletic can still only play Basques or those coming through la cantera (the literal translation is the quarry. Players, like diamonds, are found in the quarry / ground and polished, becoming the finished article). Athletic can, and have, plundered neighbouring teams for their best players such as Joseba Exteberria, Javi Martinez, David Lopez and Gaizka Torquero but there will always be a considerable reliance upon la cantera for future players too.
Upon joining Athletic, Bielsa did not ask for any new signings, working with the existing squad. Interestingly, at the start of the season, Bielsa jettisoned a number of senior players at Athletic. Whether they were considered unable to adapt to the Bielsa methods physically or would challenge his methods intellectually is open for debate.
The key ingredients existed from the outset for Bielsa to succeed.
The tradition for a direct style of football played at a high tempo was central to both Athletic and Bielsa. The reliance upon young players from la cantera gave Bielsa the opportunity to again mould young players to his footballing philosophy just as he did with Chile.
Like la cantera, Bielsa has found fertile ground at Athletic.
The Start
In pre-season Bielsa used varying formations with players operating in a number of different positions. The pre-season game against Spurs demonstrated his willingness to consider a range of possibilities and ideas in search of answers.
The use of a back three was in response to Spurs playing two strikers whilst Gabilondo and Torquero were positioned on the wings as Bielsa sought the correct solution.
This experimentation continued into the early league games. A lack of structure and cohesion leading to decidedly poor performances with the team lacking clarity as they toiled with the implementation of Bielsa’s ideas. The odd line ups continued too, only serving to add confusion to the team as players found themselves fulfilling new roles and adapting to a completely new method of playing.
The case of Oscar De Marcos is a perfect example. Notionally a striker or winger, he started the season playing at left back against Rayo Vallecano. The following week he was in midfield against Espanyol before moving back to left back and then left wing back.
With no wins in their opening 5 games, this was Athletic’s worst start to a league in 32 years accumulating just 2 points. Athletic travelled to Sociedad for the Basque derby in September and the formation changed again, back to a 4-2-3-1, a recognised formation and one they players were assured with, but more importantly than that, players were now adjusting to the Bielsa style and being played in appropriate positions.
De Marcos was now firmly in midfield, deployed as a shuttler moving back and forth, linking with the attack. Autenexte had been brought back into the fold at left back. A proper left back and a good one. Llorente had adjusted to actually moving across the front line as opposed to being stationary waiting for the ball to land on his head. His new role required much greater movement than he had been used to.
A double from Llorente sealed the points and Athletic began moving forward with some purpose. The win brought belief as well as a healthy dose of relief, easing the pressure on Bielsa.
It has taken time for Bielsa time to settle in Bilbao. Upon arrival he began instigating radical changes, offloading nine players and training became far more theoretical with key moves repeatedly practised on the training ground. This represented a clear departure from Caparros and Bielsa himself acknowledged the early errors which he made.
But as with Chile, the players accepted his ideas and began implementing them. And the results arrived.